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IN THE SlJPREIVlE COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

}),\ Y & XH~IIT IIEATIXG CO:\Ip AX Y, l.:\'T., a lTtah corporation,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

Case No.
10811

l'. :\1. RlTFF,

Defendant and Respondent.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

XATCRE OF CASE
This was an action brought under the provisions
of Section 14-2-2, l'tah Code Annotated. Plaintiffappella11t alleged in its complaint that it furnished labor
and materials under a contract with Reed S. Tew, a
general contractor, for the construction of a home on
property belonging to defendant-respondent and that
the contractor failed to pay a balance of $930.00 due
for said labor and materials.
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DISPOSITION IN LO\VEH COCHT
After answering the complaint, respondent tiled
a motion for judgment on the pleadings. This motion
was based on the ground that the pleadings showed
on their face that appellant's action was barred by the
provisions of said Section 14-2-:2. The motion was heard
on December 7, 1966, pursuant to notice. Hespornlent
filed a written memorandum in support of its motiol!
and although appellant appeared by its counsel and
argued the matter, it made no request to file a reply
memorandum. After taking the matter under a<IYisement, the lower court granted respondent's mc;tion
and on December 8, 19(:)(), entered a judgment dismissing the action.

RELIEF SOCGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent has not appealed and seeks affirmance
of the judgment entered by the lower court.

STATE)lENT OF FACTS
Respondent admits that he is the owner of prop·
erty described in the complaint and that Reed S. Tew.
a contractor, who subsequently took out bankruptcy,
constructed a home on the property for him. Respondent
did not require a labor and materialman's bond from
l\lr. Tew, but paid him in full for the job. Because he
lacks sufficient information, respondent cannot admit,
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h<m·eyer, that plaintiff furnished labor and materials
for the construction of the home, toward which there
1~ still a balance owing of $930.00, or that such sum
is the reasonable value of any labor and materials furnished to the property. Respondent recognizes that for
the purposes of this appeal, the facts well-pleaded by
appellant must be assumed to be true.

STATE:\IEXT OF POINTS
APPELLAXT HAD NO ~!ORE THAN ONE
YEAH AFTER THE EFFECTIYE DATE OF
THE A~IEXD~IEXT TO SECTION 14-2-2,
C'L\II CODE AXNOTATED, IN 'YHICH TO
BlUXG THIS ACTION. NOT HA YING DONE
SO. THE ACTIOX IS BARRED AND THE
LO\ YER COCHT PROPERLY SO RCLED.
Hespondent does not quarrel with the cases and
authorities cited by appellant in Point I of its brief.
HoweYer, appellant's reliance upon them, under the
circumstances of this case, is misplaced. They· are inapplicable for several reasons.
First, this case does not invoke a regular statute
of limitations but rather what is often called a statute
of creation or a "built-in" limitation. Second, Section
U-2-2 need not be applied retroactiYely, as appellant
argues, to bar this action. Third, there was no action
pendi11IT
when the amendment to Section 14-2-2 became
b
effective.
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Appellant argues that amendmeuts to statutes nf
limitation should not be given retroactive affect unlcs,
it affirmatively appears that such was the intention
of the legislature. This may be true as a general rule.
However, it is not generally true when the limitation
is part of the statute creating the right itself. The
distinction is pointed out in 34 Am. J ur., Limitation
of Actions, §7 as follows:
"A statute of limitations should he differentiated from conditions which are annexed to a
right of action created by statute. A statute
which in itself creates a new liability. gives an
action to enforce it unknown to the common
law, and fixes the time within which that action
may be commenced, is not a statute of limitations.
It is a statute of creation, and the commencement of the action within the time it fixes is an
indispensible condition of the liability and of
the action which it permits. The time element
is an inherent element of the right so created. and
the limitation of the remedv is a limitation of
the right. Such a provision wfll control, no matter
in what form the action is brought."
That the rule regarding "retrospective application"
is different under such statutes of creation is pointed
out in 53 C.J.S., Limitation of Actions, §.J.(a) and (c),
which state:
(a) "\\There the cause of action involved is
one created bv statute, and the time for commencing the ~ction is a condition of liability,
it is not a statute of limitations and will operate
retrospectively if a contrary intention is not
manifest.

•
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( c) "\Vhen the statute declares generally that
no action, or no action of a certain class shall
be brought, except within a c~rtain limited time
after it shall have accrued, the language of the
statute would naturally make it apply to past
actions as well as to those arising in the future,
and the fact that the statute makes no exception
of existing causes of action raises a strong presumption that it intended to make none, although this conclusion has also been emphatically denied." (.Emphasis added).
The aboye rule was applied in Earle v. Frocdtcrt
Groin & Jlaltin,r; Co., 85 P.:2d 264 (\Vash. 1939), which
was an action by a state court receiver to recover an
alleged preference. A statute, which became effective
on June 10, 1931, provided that actions by receivers
<1r trustees to recover preferences had to be commenced
within six months from the time of the filing of the
application for the appointment of the receiver or
trustee. The application for the appointment of plai!1titf as receiver was made on August U, 1930. The
Supreme Court of
ashington, while acknowledging
that generally statutes ought not to be construed to
operate retrospectively in the absence of language indicating such a legislative intent, distinguished between
ordinary statutes of limitation and those included within the right itself. In this connection it said:

"r

"The statute defining and allowing recovery
for a preference creates a statutory, legal liability. subject to the limitation that a suit to
t·nforce it must be commenced within six months
from the time of filing the application for the

5

appointment of a trustee, etc. The limitation is
not one that goes to the remedy of a defendant
like the ordinary statute of limitation, but it
goes to the cause of action or right to sue. The
time prescribed-six months from the time 0 i·
filing the application for appointment of the
trustee for the commencement of the actionis a condition to the enforcement of the liabilitv
or the trustee's right of recovery, an elemer{t
in the right itself. The right falls with the failure to commence the action within the allotted
time.
"'Ve believe the new statute of limitations provided for a reasonable time within which to commence causes of action which accrued prior to
its enactment. The six months' statute of limitations, provided for by the statute before us.
operates in futuro from June 10, 1931, governs
with respect to respondent's pre-existing cause
of action, limits it, and the full time allowed
by the new statute within which to institute the
action, became applicable to his cause of action.
The limitation prescribed by the neu: statute
commenced when the cause of action 'ltHL.'I .first
subjected to the operation of the statute, that is,
upon its effective date." (Emphasis added).
See also, Morris v. Orcas Lime Co., 53 P.2d 604
(Wash. 1936).
In O'Dono,ghue v. State, 405 P.2d 258 (\Vash.
1965), the State of 'Vashington enacted a statute providing that claims against the state for damages arising
out of tortuous conduct had to be presented and filed
with the state within 120 days from the date that the
claim arose. Prior to the statute and at the time plain-
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tiffs' claim arose, the period was two years. Plaintiffs
rnntended that to apply the 120 day limitation to them
would deny them "a vested right by a retrospective
application of the statute." The court said that this arrrument was untenable and concluded:
b
"The legislature has prescribed the limitations
and the manner in which suits must be brought.
Claim statutes of the type involved here are
mandatory and compliance with them is a condition precedent to recovery (citing cases).
''The fact that the legislature amends the procedure, or rather limits the time for filing suits,
does not prejudice substantive rights of appellants. Appellants not only had the benefit of a
120-day period in which to file a claim with the
state auditor but also had 29 days from the time
the cause of action arose until the legislation
became effective. Consequently, it is seen that
no sense of this retrospective application of the
law."
In Earl JV. Baker & Co. v. Morris, 54 P.2d 353
(Okla. 1935), a case wherein the legislature reduced
the time within which the Oklahoma Industrial Commission retained jurisdiction to re-open causes upon
applications based upon changed conditions, stated:

"Though not precisely in point, we think the
reasoning here im·olved is substantially consistent with the rule that 'where the cause of action
i1woh-ed is created bv statute, and the time for
commencing the acti~n is a condition of liability,
it is not a statute of limitations and will operate
retrospectively if a contrary intention is not
manifest.' "
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Appellant contends that the amendment to Section
14-2-2 must be applied retrospectively in order to bar
its action. Respondent submits that such is not the case.
If appellant had brought this action within one year
from the effective date of the amendment, but more
than a year after furnishing the labor and materials,
there might be a question of retrospective application.
but it did not do so, and the court is not faced with
the problem of determining what the result would be
in such a situation. Or if it appeared that appellant
was given a short and unreasonable length of time
after the amendment in which to file its action, there
might be a question of due process or legislative intent.
But, in fact, under the rule adopted by most jurisdictions, it had as much time to bring the action as any
claimant whose rights arose concurrent with or subsequent to the enactment of the amendment.
The rule was stated in Hanford v. Kiny County,
192 Pac. 1013 (\Vash. 1920) as follows:
"The statute not being retroactive, to what extent does it apply to causes of action which had
accrued at the time it became operative? U pnn
this question, in Baer v. Choir, 7 "rash. 631, 32
Pac. 776, 36 Pac. 286, the rule of the Pnited
States Supreme Court (Sohn v.
aterson, 17
Wal. [U.S.} 596, 21 L. Ed 737) was adopted,
which is to the effect that a new statute of limitations takes effect upon the pre-existing rights
of action and limits them, but in every such case
the full time allowed by the new stah1te is arnilable to the complainant; in other words, the
limitation of the new statute as applied to pre-

"r

0
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existing causes of action commences when the
cause uf action i.s· first subjected to the operation
of the statute unless the legislature has otherwise provided." (Emphasis added).
In O'Donor;hue v. State, supra., the "rashington
Supreme Court stated:
"'Ye have said that statutes affecting vested
rights will be construed as operating prospectively only (citing cases). That is exactly what
is being done in this case. The appellant's time
to file his claim ran from the effective date of
this statute. The issue here is procedural or
remedial rather than one affecting a substantive
right."
In 'Yood on Limitation of Actions, J.th Ed., p.
59, it is said:
"If before the statute bar has become complete the statutory period is changed, and no
mention is made of existing claims, it is generally
held that the old law is not modified by the new
so as to give to both statutes a proportionate
effect, but that the time passed is effaced, and
the new law governs; that is, the period provided by the new law must run upon all existing
claims in order to constitute a bar. In other
words, the statute in force at the time the action
is brought controls unless the time limit by the
old statute for commencing an action has elapsed,
while the old statute was in force before the suit
is brought, in which case the suit is barred."
Oli1.H1s v. l'Veincr, 27 4 P.2d 476 (Cal. App. 2d 1954),

was an action for malpractice based on defendant's
attendance at plaintiff's birth 22 years before the action
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was brought. A statute was amended about ten
after plaintiff's birth to provide that:

year~

"Any action by or on behalf of a minor for
personal injuries sustained prior to or in the
course of his birth must be brought within six
years from the date of the birth of the minor."
The plaintiff contended that to apply the limitation
to his cause of action would constitute a retroactire
application of the amendment, unwarranted in absence
of legislative intent that it was meant to apply retroactively. In holding that the amendment applied to
causes of action that had already accrued prior to its
enactment the court said:
"Plaintiff argues that the amendment operates
retrospecticely because it starts the time running
from the date of his birth, viz., December I,
1931, and therefore purports to cut off his right
of action immediately upon its passage; hence
it is invalid as to him. Since, under most circumstances, such a result would be unconstitutional
and in any event, harsh and unreasonable, 'It
will be presumed that such is not the intent of
the legislature,' Sohn v. 'Vaterson, 17 'Vall.
596, 599, 21 L. Ed. 737. Statutes are presumed
to operate prospectively. * * * This amendment is no exception to such rule. Anyone ha\'ing
a right of action under the statute had six years
after the amendment become effective within
which to file his complaint. A statute is not
made retroactive merely because it drates upon
facts existing prior to its enactment. Thus
changes in procedural law have been held applicable to existing causes of action. The effect
of such statutes is actuall.Y prospective in n~durc
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since they relate to the procedure to be followed
in the future. Xational Automobile & Cas. Ins.
Co. v. Downey, 98 Cal. App.2d 58(}, 590, 220
P.2d 962; Argues v. N" ational Superior Co., 67
Cal. App.2d 7ti:3, 778, 155 P.2d fi43; Earle v.
Froedtert Grain & :\Ialting Co., 197 'Vash. 341,
85 P.2d 264." (Emplrnsis added.)
Another case applying the same rule is Oklahoma
I~'111plu,1;111cnt Security Commission v. Eddie, 154 P.2d
ili:J (Oki. 1944). This was an action to recover employers' contributions which became due in 1936 and
IU37. l 11 1941 the act allowing actions to recover contributions was amended to provide that such actions
must he eommenced within three years after the date
on whieh the quarterly return was required to be filed.
Prior thereto there was no limitation. The court, applying the a hon rule, said:
"The l941 amendment fixing a limitation of
three years for this character of action became
effective :\Iav 16, 1941. At that time three years
had already ~lapsed with respect to these c~uses
of action. The amendment contains nothing to
indicate a legislative intent to immediately bar
claims with respect to which the three years
had already run."
"The rule governing such cases is clearly
stated in )lagnolia Petroleum Company v. 'Vatkins. et al., 177 Oki. 30, 57 P.2d 622, 623. Paragraph 2 of the syllabus thereto is as follows:
'In construing a statute of limitations, it must,
so far as it affects rights of action in existence
when the statute is passed, be held, in the absence of a contrary provision, to begin when
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the cause of action is first subjected to its op.
eration."
Another Oklahoma case to the same effect j,
Sheffel 'l'. Cities Service Oil Co., 222 P.2d 1024 (Ok!
1950).

In 1Vare v. Heller, H8 P.2<l 410 (Cal. App.~d
1944), amendments were made in 19:33 to a foreclosure
stah1te. One amendment provided that:
"Any such action (for deficiency judgment!
must be brought within three months of the time
of sale under such deed of trust or mortgage."
The issue, as stated by the court, was whether tht
three month statute of limitation applied to an action
brought on a 1931 note. The court refused to gin
retroactive effect to another amendment relating to
fair market value, but held that the three month statute
applied and said:
"There is no inconsistency in holding that the
fair-market value provisions of Section 580a
are not applicable to an action brought on a 1931
note, and in holding that the section's three
months' statute of limitations is applicable. Provisions such as those first ref erred to, which
would place a limitation upon the amount that
the holder of a note may receive, fall within the
definition of retrospective statutes; they would
affect a right which existed before the statute
was passed. Rut a provision dealing with the
period within which an action may be brought.
so long as it does not reduce the time to such
an extent that it amounts to a deprivation of
an opportunity to enforce a pre-existing right,
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is not 'retroactive' because it does not affect
a right or obligation of the pre-existing contract.
* * * procedural changes operate on existing
causes of actions and defenses and it is a misnomer to designate them as having retrospective
effect."
This court has previously given effect to the general principles set forth above, in connection with a
limitations case. In Silver King Coalition 1llines Co. v.
J11d11strial Commission, 2 Utah 2d 1, 268 P.2d 689
1 I954) , an amendment, extending the time after exposure within which death benefits might be payable
for the death of a miner dying of silicosis, was passed
before the death of a miner but after he had left this
employment. It was held that interpreting the amendment to enable the widow to recover for the miner's
death which occurred after expiration of the period
prescribed by the statute in effect at the time of exposure did not amount to giving the amendment a
proscribed retroactive effect. The court therein stated:
"A statute is not made retroactive merely because it draws on antecedent facts for its operation. (citing cases). A law is retrospective, in
its legal sense, which takes away or impairs
vested rights acquired under existing laws, or
creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty,
or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions or considerations already passed."
The court concluded that a right could not be considered as vested unless it was something more than a
mere expectation based upon an anticipated continuation of present laws.
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Further, the effect of amendments to statutes <JJ
limitation was discussed in a separate opinion by .J ustict
Larson in State J'(U' Commission v. Spani:·;h Fork, HU
Ut. 177, 100 P.2d 575, wherein he stated:
"An examination of the cases reHects generally the distinction that where the change 11 1
the statute affects only the remedy, the legislature may change the time or manner of enforcing a right or existing cause of action a~
long as it does not extinguish or wipe out an
existing right. Parties to contracts Im ve no
vested interest in particular limitation laws or
methods of procedure for the enforcement of
rights."
None of the Utah cases cited by appellant are really
germane to the problem invoked in the present case.
They all deal with retroactive application of substantive laws, not those of remedy or procedure, and some
in fact recognize that procedural laws may be treate<l
differently. The ~l crcur case ( 1ll crcur Gold 1lli11i11.r; &.
illilling Co. ·r. Spry, 16 Utah 222, 52 Pac. 382).
for example, dealt primarily with the question of
whether a constitutional pro\'ision was self-executing.
Holding that it was not, this court merely decided that
a statute implementing the constitutional provision
could not be applied to circumstances occurring prior
to the passage of the statute.

Archer 'l'. L'tah State Land Board, 1.5 Utah :.2d
321, 392 Pac. 622, involved a situation where the State
Land Board was given authority, after the original
complaint was filed,to conduct hearings and enter orders
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in connection with matters under its jurisdiction. The
court rejected the contention that because of this statute
the district court lost jurisdiction and said:
"Ordinarily the facts and the law in a given
lawsuit are to be applied as of the date of the
filing of the original complaint."
This case actually supports the position of respondent
rather than appellant.

I 11 re I ngraham's Estate, 106 Utah 337, 148 P.2d
:HO. inn1lYed an amended statute which provided that
gifts to charitable organizations could be deducted in
arriYing at the net taxable estate for inheritance tax
purposes. The court, recognizing that there is a difference between procedural and substantive changes, found
this was not merely a procedural enactment but one
of substance. In arriving at its conclusion, the court
noted that to apply the statute retroactiYely would
place a premium on procrastination and said:
"The law has always sought to award the
diligent and refuse its approval of delay."
In this case the appellant would have the court
do just the opposite.
The 11lcCarey case (b'lcCarey t•. State Teachers
Retirement Board, I l l Utah 257, 177 P.2d 725) clearly
inrnlves a situation where retroactive application of
a statute would haYe impaired vested rights.
The remaining authorities cited by appellant deal
with pending actions. There is no doubt that a statute
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of limitations would not be applied retroactiYe]y• tu d.
case whid1 has been filed and is pending at the timt
of its enactment, but such is not the case here. Thii
action was not filed until oyer a year after the amend.
ment took effect.

CONCLUSION"
The amendment limiting to one year the tirm
within which Section 14-2-2 actions can be brought
is not a regular statute of limitations, but a built-:u
limitation. At the time appellant brought its action
the only right it had to do was by Yirtue of Section
14-2-2. Since the limitation was then part of the right,
appellant was bound by it. \Yhere the right is ont
created by statute and the time proYided therein for
commencing the action is stated, such is not a statutt
of limitations and will operate retrospecti,·ely unless
a contrary intention is affirmatiYely shown. There i.'
no question here of appellant being depriHd of an opportunity to bring its action for eyen giwn a retrospective application of the statute, it had eight month'
after this statute was passed and ten months after it
became effectiYe in which to bring its action.
'Yithout giving the statute a retrospectiq application, under the rule adopted hy most jurisdictions,
appellant's action is barred. This rule prm·ides that the
limitation prescribed by the new statute commenced
when the cause of action was first subjected to the
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operation of the statute. Under such rule, appellant
would haYe had until ~lay 11, 1966, in which to bring
this action. However, it did not do so until September,
J 91ili. Thus, the action is barred and the lower court
properly granted respondent's motion.
Respectfully submitted,
ROE, JER~IAN & DART
B. L. Dart, Jr.
Ralph L. Jerman
510 American Oil Building

Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Defendant and
Respondent
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